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Switzerland 
 
 
1. Country facts  
 
1.1 Political background 
 
Switzerland is a Federal State since 1848 – one of 23 in the world and the second oldest 
after the United States of America. The country has a federal structure with three different 
political levels:  
 
The Confederation has authority in all areas in which it is empowered by the Federal 
Constitution. Tasks that do not expressly fall within the domain of the Confederation are 
matters for the cantons.  
 
The Cantons are the original States, which joined together in 1848 to form the Confederation 
to which they ceded part of their sovereignty. Since the creation of the Canton Jura in 1978, 
Switzerland consists of 23 cantons, three of which, namely Unterwalden, Appenzell and 
Basel, are for historical reasons divided into two half-cantons. Each canton and half-canton 
has its own constitution, parliament, government and courts.  
 
The Communes (currently 2,873) have tasks and competencies entrusted to them by the 
Confederation and the canton – such as the population register, the areas of education and 
social affairs, energy supply, etc. The degree of autonomy granted to the communes is 
determined by the individual canton and therefore varies considerably.  
 
The Swiss legislative power (the Federal Assembly) is represented by a parliament 
composed of two chambers directly elected by the people:  the National Council with 200 
members and the Council of States representing the cantons with 46 representatives (2 per 
canton). The Federal Assembly elects the government, namely the seven members of the 
Federal Council as well as the Federal Chancellor, its chief of staff, thereby forming the 
Executive. The Supreme Court is also elected by the legislative authority of the Federal 
Assembly. 
 
Although federalism is important in the Swiss political structure, the competencies of the 
telecommunications regulation remain exclusively at the national level. The regulation is 
assured by the Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM) which belongs to the Federal 
Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication (DETEC), and by the 
Federal Communications Commission (ComCom). The OFCOM holds the administrative 
competency of telecommunications regulation on behalf of the DETEC whereas the 
ComCom, which is an extra-parliamentary commission, is responsible for the assignment of 
telecommunication licenses and approval of national frequency and numbering plans. 
  
The statutory competency is divided between the DETEC (political) and the ComCom which 
is considered as the independent regulatory authority composed of 5 to 7 commissioners who 
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are experts on telecom. Decisions of the DETEC and the ComCom are implemented by the 
OFCOM. This institutional structure – which seems very particular – is built on a Swiss 
“recipe” of shared competencies and separation of powers.  
 
1.2 Demography  
 
• Population: 7,261,200 1 inhabitants as of end 2001 
 
• Density: 176 inhabitants/km2    
 
Population density in Switzerland is not among the highest in Europe, but there is a 
significant difference between the lowlands (from Geneva to St.Gallen) and the mountain 
areas. While the average population density is very low in the mountains – which represent 
about half of the territory – it is very high in plain and metropolitan areas.  
The highest population density rates of Switzerland are found in the city-canton of Basel, and 
the Geneva and Zurich metropolitan areas, with respective 5,045, 1,467 and 711 inhabitants 
per km2. These cities represent the main urban centers of Switzerland. Other examples of 
high population density rates are the Canton of Basel-Country (505), the Canton of Aargau 
(393) and the Canton of Solothurn (311). The rates in the mountain area are much lower. For 
example, the Cantons of Graubünden, Valais, Uri and Glarus have respective population 
densities of 26, 53, 33 and 56 inhabitant per km2 and cover together about half of the Swiss 
territory.  
 
1.3 Telecom consumption habits  
 
• Mobile and fixed telephony 
 
Table 1: Telecom consumption habits Switzerland, mobile and fixed telephony 
 
Fixed voice telephony End 1998 End 2000 End 2002 
Number of subscribers 4.274 million 4.108 million 4.078 million 
Penetration rate (inhab.) 60% 57% 56.2% 
Mobile telephony    
Number of subscribers 1.698 million 4.639 million 5.747 million 
Penetration rate (inhab.)  23.8% 64.4% 79.1% 
 
Source: OFCOM, Statistique des télécommunications, évolution jusqu’au 31 décembre 2002 pour certains 
indicateurs, 2003  
 
While there is a decline in the number of fixed telephony lines, mobile penetration increases 
rapidly in Switzerland. The penetration rate increased from 64.4% end 2000 to 79.1% at end 
2002. The number of mobile subscriptions surpassed the number of fixed-line subscriptions 
in the fall of 2000. However, since 2001 the annual rate of increase in the number of mobile 
subscribers is lowering, showing that the Swiss market is close to saturation level.  
                                                          
1  Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 31.12.2001 
2 Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2001 
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In international comparison, Switzerland ranks quite high in terms of mobile penetration, as 
shown in the figure below.  
 
Figure 1: Mobile telephony subscribers per 100 inhabitants, international comparison 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources ITU and OFCOM 
 
• Internet 
 
Table 2: Internet consumption habits Switzerland 
Internet End 1998 End 2000 End 2002 
Penetration rate PC/100 
inhabitants 
53.3% 65.2% 71.1% 
Internet users/100 inhab.1 13.2% 29.1% 35.2% 
Internet subscriptions/100 
inhab.2 
6.0% 23.1% 32.4% 
Broadband subscriptions, 
of which 
6’172 48’466 455’220 
ADSL 0% 0.01% 42.9% 
Cable modem 100% 98.88% 57.1%  
Penetration rate 
broadband/ 100 inhab. 
0.1 % 0.7% 6.3% 
 
Source: OFCOM, Statistique des télécommunications, évolution jusqu’au 31 décembre 2002 pour certains 
indicateurs, 2003 and own calculations stemming from this source 
 
1 This indicator comprises private and professional users who access Internet at least twice a week. 
2 This indicator comprises private and corporate Internet users who have a subscription with a registered Internet 
provider. 
 
Figure 2: Breakdown of Internet access types in Switzerland, December 2001, Source: OFCOM, Statistique 
officielle 2001, May 2003 
 
 
The very high penetration rate of personnal 
computers in Switzerland3, could lead to think 
that the country makes a very extensive use of 
Internet. However, the number of Internet 
users is rather average and comparable to the 
penetration rates of France and Germany, 
                                                          
3  For 2001, PC Penetration rate in Switzerland was 68% against 33.7% in France, 38.22% in Germany, and 
25.65% South Korea (where the number and popularity of Internet Cafés is extremely high).   
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whereas in Denmark and Korea, the penetration rate of Internet users exceeds 50% of the 
population. Especially in the field of ADSL, the penetration rate in Switzerland is low 
compared to many other countries with equivalent purchasing power such as Canada, the 
United States, Sweden and Denmark. One explanation for this is that ADSL was launched 
only in October 2000 and as a matter of fact, the success of ADSL has been very quick and 
substantial after that4.  
 
2. Brief telecom history 
 
2.1 Historical background and liberalization process 
 
In Switzerland, the first step of liberalization in telecommunications took place in 1992 with 
the reform of the legislation on telegraphs and telephone correspondence (LCTT).5 The new 
legislative package of 1992 introduced liberalization in the so-called wide range services 
market6 (commutation of messages, services of memorization, etc), while basic services 
(telephone services, voice communications, telex, etc.) remained a monopoly of the Swiss 
PTT company. However, rapid technological developments, combined with the aim of 
promoting competition, encouraged Switzerland to join the European Union in its efforts to 
liberalize the various telecommunications markets.  
 
The Federal Council took the initiative to introduce the necessary changes and proposed the 
liberalization of telecommunications on June 10, 1996 (cf. ‘message’). The Federal Law was 
adopted on April 30, 1997 (LTC), and came into effect on January 1, 1998 (on the same date 
as the European Telecommunications Legislative Framework). During the two years that 
preceded the liberalization, a considerable number of companies established themselves in 
Switzerland and started preparing to enter this new competitive market. 
 
With the liberalization of the market, the legal monopoly of the Swiss Telecom PTT in the field 
of telecommunications was broken. The national telecom provider was separated from the 
postal activities, became a public limited-traded company on October 1, 1997 and changed 
its name to Swisscom AG. By allowing other telecom operators to offer services in 
competition with Swisscom, Switzerland made the decisive jump from a monopoly situation to 
the status of a commercial market.  
                                                          
4  OFCOM, Utilisation de l’Internet en Suisse, 2002 
5  Source : OFCOM & ComCom 
6  “Value-added services 
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2.2 Incumbent operator 
 
Swisscom remains the largest telecommunication provider in Switzerland although its market 
shares have continuously decreased over the past 5 years. The former national provider had 
to reform its functioning and structure considerably in order to become a competitive 
company. Today, Swisscom is one of Europe's best positioned telecommunications operators 
with revenue of CHF 14.526 billion in 2002 and 20,470 employees.7 Swisscom offers a 
comprehensive range of telecom products and services and is clearly positioned as the 
leading provider of mobile, fixed voice, data services and Internet-based services. Swisscom 
operates as a Group since January 1, 2002.  
 
The Swisscom Group is currently structured into six companies:  
 
Swisscom Fixnet AG 
   
Comprises all national and international activities in fixed-network 
telephony including network infrastructure and wholesale. 
Swisscom Fixnet also covers the largely autonomous business 
areas of Operator Services (directory enquiry services), Payphone 
Services (public payphones), Cards (phone cards, prepaid cards), 
Bluewin Ltd. and subsidiary companies cablex AG, Telecom FL AG 
and Swisscom Directories AG. 
Swisscom Mobile AG Since April 2001, Swisscom Mobile has been operating as a public 
limited-traded company in which Swisscom has a 75% share and 
the Vodafone Group the other 25%. With 3.6 million customers and 
a market share of 62.9%, Swisscom Mobile is the leading provider 
of mobile communications in Switzerland (December 2002). 
Swisscom Enterprise 
Solutions AG   
Swisscom Enterprise Solutions AG implements telecom solutions 
for international companies as well as small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
Swisscom IT Services 
AG:  
Swisscom IT Services plans, constructs, integrates and operates 
basic applications as well as highly complex IT solutions for 
processing large data volumes. 
Swisscom Systems 
AG   
Provides a comprehensive range of services (maintaining, 
financing, renting, and leasing products) in the field of private 
branch exchanges (PBXs). 
Debitel AG:   Publicly quoted, Debitel AG is the largest network-independent 
telephone company in Europe and the third largest mobile provider 
in Germany. As a service provider, Debitel collaborates with 
network operators like Vodafone-D2, T-Mobile, E-Plus and Quam. 
Swisscom holds a 93% share. 
  
 
                                                          
7  Source: Swisscom, 31.12.2001 
 6
Despite important investments and acquisitions, the balances show that the Swisscom Group 
has been highly profitable over the past years, and has good perspectives for the future. The 
publicly held shares are currently traded at a price that is 16% above the IPO (Initial Public 
Offering) in 1998 (IPO, 5 October 1998 = 340 CHF / 26 May 2003 = 396 CHF).   
 
Table 3: Key figures Swisscom 
 
Revenue CHF 14.53 billion 
Operating income (EBITDA) CHF 4.41 billion 
Fixed network channels (PSTN + ISDN) 5.3 million 
Mobile customers 3.6 million 
Debitel customers 10 million 
Bluewin customers:  860,000 
Employees:  20,470 
Source: Swisscom Group Activity report 2002, Swisscom Company profile 
 
Table 4: Swisscom AG profile in 2002 
 
Name Swisscom Group AG 
Services Full service: Fixed, Mobile and Internet 
Date of entry 1878 
Ownership % 62.7% Swiss government (Federal Department of Finance) 
Market share % Subscribers Call minutes Revenues 
Fixed lines 
Subscriber lines 
Local calls 
Long-distance 
International 
 
>99 % 
 
 
 
72%1 
68 %1 
54 %1  
 
 
 
 
Mobile 62.9%1   
Internet 
Dial-up 
DSL 
 
35.3%2 
56%3 
 
 
 
 
1 Swisscom, Simply Steady, simply solid, simply Swisscom, 3rd quarter 2002 results presentation, November 2002 
2 Swisscom Activity report 2002, 2003; OFCOM, Statistique des télécommunications: évolution jusqu’au 31 
décembre 2002 pour certains indicateurs, 2003, own calculation stemming from this source 
3 Swisscom, Activity Report 2002, 2003, own calculations stemming from this source 
 
Source OFCOM / Swisscom 
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2.3 Competing Operators 
 
Since the 1998 liberalization, the Federal Office of Communications has registered 299 
providers for fixed network services, 40 providers for mobile services, and has awarded four 
3G licenses.  
 
• Fixed voice telephony  
With the liberalization of the market, a large number of competing telecommunications 
providers are now operating in Switzerland on national or regional level. While Swisscom still 
operates possesses over 99% of subscriber lines and 72% of local traffic because of its local 
loop monopoly, alternative providers (Sunrise, Tele2, etc.) operate more than half of the 
regional and national traffic.  
 
Sunrise Telecommunications/TDC Switzerland 
The current status of Sunrise is the result of a merger in November 2000 between the two 
main competitors to Swisscom, Sunrise (fixed telephony) and diAx (fixed and mobile 
telephony), which were both majority owned by TDC. TDC bought the remaining shares from 
the Swiss railways and investment bank UBS. The company is now traded as TDC 
Switzerland but the brand Sunrise has been retained for the time being.  
 
Tele 2 Switzerland 
Tele2 Switzerland is wholly owned by Tele2AB, a Swedish operator active in 23 European 
countries. In Switzerland, Tele2 offers fixed telephony, Internet and Mobile telephony 
services via its MVNO Network. Tele2 is the second alternative operator for fixed telephony 
on the Swiss market.  
 
 
• Mobile market 
At the end of 2002, four mobile telephony providers were operating in Switzerland: the new 
entrants, Sunrise and Orange with respectively 19,8% and 16.8% market share and 
Swisscom with a 62.9% market share. The fourth mobile operator Tele2 has a MVNO 
agreement with Swisscom, and a market share of approximately 0.5%.   
 
Swisscom Mobile 
Swisscom, the leading mobile operator in Switzerland, has over 3.6 million customers (end 
2002) and a market share of approximately 62.9% 
Ownership: Swisscom 75% (Switzerland), Vodafone Group 25% (UK) 
 
Sunrise (merger with diAx)  
Sunrise is the second largest mobile operator in Switzerland with 1’134’000 mobile customers 
as of End 2002 and approximately 19.8% of market share.  
Ownership: 100% TDC 
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Orange Communications 
Orange is the third largest mobile operators with 963’000 subscribers as of end 2002 and a 
market share of approximately 16.8%.  
Ownership: 100% France Télécom  
 
Tele2 
Tele2 has a MVNO network agreement with Swisscom and is the fourth operator on the 
Swiss market with a market share of 0.5%. Tele2 is wholly owned by Tele2 AB from Sweden.  
 
Figure 3: Mobile Operator Market Shares by Subscriber in Switzerland 
 
62.9 % 
19,8% 
16.8% 
Swisscom
TDC Switzerland
Orange
 
 
Source : Operators (End 2002) 
 
 
• Internet market8 
 
Sunrise Telecommunications / TDC Switzerland 
Sunrise is Swisscom’s major competitor on the Internet market (dial-up and ADSL) with 
557’000 Internet customers as of May 20039 or a market share of approximately 23.7%.  
 
Cablecom 
Ownership: Cablecom was purchased by the British NTL in March 2000. It is Switzerland’s 
leading cable TV operator with a 53% market share and 1.5 million subscribers in 12 cities. 
Services: In addition to offering CATV service, Cablecom also owns one of the country’s 
largest ISPs, SwissOnline, which has around 150,000 Internet customers, and offers a 
broadband cable modem service under this brand.  
 
NTL has a strategic network upgrade program for this subsidiary covering some 75% of the 
country. This is the key for attracting business-to-business customers with high-tech carrier 
services and broadband Internet access. 
 
                                                          
8  Source: IDC (2001), OFCOM (2002) 
9  Sunrise website, May 2003 
 9
Other key elements of the strategy include the increase of transmission capacity in major 
cities and the introduction value-added services such as digital interactive, subscription, and 
pay per view television, in addition to telephony.  
 
3. Legal framework  
 
3.1 EU directives  
 
As Switzerland is not part of the European Union, the country has no obligation to comply 
with EU laws and regulations. However, EU directives are often used as guidelines to amend 
and revise the Swiss law. The development of communications towards a global information 
society and the envisaged liberalization of telecoms market in the European Union put 
significant pressure on the Swiss telecom system. Switzerland launched the reform of its 
telecommunications sector at the same time as the European Union, and the liberalization 
came into effect on the same date10 as in the EU countries.  
 
Nevertheless, after five years of liberalization, the Swiss legislation shows some weaknesses 
in comparison with the EU objectives and regulatory framework. While the European Union 
clearly laid down the objectives for competition in telecommunications, for instance local loop 
unbundling, the Swiss Telecommunications Law is less specific on telecom competition 
objectives, leaving more room for interpretation. Many current supporters of incumbent 
protectionism like to remind that Switzerland is not a EU-member and consequently has no 
obligation or need to follow the EU directives.   
 
3.2 General national framework for Telecommunications 
 
In Switzerland, the federal law that implemented the liberalization and the regulation of the 
telecommunications sector (LTC) came into effect on January 1, 1998. The Federal Council 
took the initiative and proposed the liberalization of telecommunications in June 1996. In 
August, the Federal Parliament began its deliberations and approved the law by a final vote 
on April 30, 1997. It took less than one year to examine a law that was destined to 
fundamentally change the telecommunication landscape in Switzerland. The new Telecom 
Law is linked to the Post Office Reform and confirms the separation of telecommunications 
and postal services. This demonstrates the importance which legislators attached to this 
subject and the urgency of adopting a new law, which takes into account technological, 
commercial and political developments in the telecommunications sector.  
                                                          
10  1 January 1998 
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Table 5: Telecommunications Law (LTC) 
Of April 30, 1997 (status of January 1, 2003) 
 
General provisions 
Chapter 1 
Objectives :  
1. Ensure that a range of cost-effective, high quality and 
nationally and internationally competitive telecom services are 
available 
2. Ensure reliable universal services for the whole population at 
affordable prices and with a defined quality 
3. Ensure respect of personal and intangible property rights 
4. Allow effective competition  
5. Regulate the transmission of information by means of 
telecommunications techniques 
Universal service  
Chapter 2, 
Section 2 
The universal service is assured through licensing, based on a 
periodical open invitation to tender. The Communications 
Commission is the authority which grants the license.  
The Federal Council has the competencies to change the detailed 
rules for implementation (scope and quality of services as well as 
price caps). The Commission (ComCom) and the Office (OFCOM) 
ensure that the US is provided properly.  
The financing of US is assured by the operators’ contributions.  
Universal service content: Public telephone service, emergency calls, 
directories, public telephone cells, transcription service for people 
with impaired hearing.  
Interconnection 
regulation 
Chapter 2 , 
Section1 
Prices for interconnection are negotiated between the operators 
wishing to interconnect their networks. When after a negotiation 
period of 3 months no agreement can be reached, the ComCom may 
be requested to rule on the interconnection prices and conditions. 
There is no ex ante price setting for interconnection but as a 
principle, prices should by cost-oriented. Interconnected operators 
are requested to forward the conditions of their interconnection 
agreement to the OFCOM.  
Rates regulation 
Chapter 2 , 
Section 2 
The Federal Council fixes prices caps for USO; for all other services 
primacy is left to competition to regulate retail prices on the market.  
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4. Key regulatory actors  
4.1 National Regulatory Bodies  
The Swiss Regulatory Agency was established in 1992, to accompany the full liberalization 
process. It is composed of the Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM) who acts as the 
operative arm of the Federal Communications Commission (ComCom) established in 1997. 
The Swiss regulator is converged, i.e., it deals both with telecommunications and 
broadcasting.   
 
It is the OFCOM that is regarded as the Swiss NRA, but the OFCOM cannot be considered 
independently of its decision-making body, the ComCom, as in the end, it is the ComCom 
who makes decisions on telecommunications matters and the OFCOM that implements them. 
This regulatory structure with shared responsibilities between the ComCom and the OFCOM 
is quite particular and is due to the Swiss’ attachment to the principle of shared competencies 
and separation of powers.  
 
4.1.2 The Federal Communications Commission (ComCom) 
 
The ComCom is the independent regulatory authority for telecommunications. Article 5 of the 
LTC established the ComCom as the licensing authority and market regulatory body in the 
telecommunications sector. The Commission currently consists of 7 members - who must be 
independent experts- nominated by the Federal Council. The ComCom is independent of the 
administrative authorities and has its own secretariat11. It is not subject to any Federal 
Council or Department directives. It informs the public of its activities and produces a report 
each year to the attention of the Federal Council.12 The president convokes the Commission 
as required or upon a request by a member. 
 
The ComCom is the body that grants licenses for telecommunications service providers13, 
designates interconnection conditions in the first instance, when service providers cannot 
reach an agreement14, awards universal service licenses15 and licenses for the use of radio 
communication frequencies16. In addition, the ComCom approves national numbering plans 
and the national frequency plan17 and regulates the terms of application for number portability 
and the free choice of supplier18 . The ComCom also takes measures, based on the OFCOM 
proposals, in the case of infraction to the Law, and has the competency to withdraw 
                                                          
11  The Commission secretariat consists of one manager (full-time), one scientific associate (40%) and one 
administrative secretary (60%). Before the Commission had its own offices and employees, its secretariat was 
provided ad interim by the OFCOM.  
12  With the purpose of informing the Federal Council. Approval is not required.  
13  Art. 5 LTC 
14  Art. 11 LTC 
15  Art. 14 LTC 
16  Art. 22 LTC 
17 Art. 25 LTC 
18  Art. 28 LTC 
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licenses19. For a number of its tasks, the ComCom has delegated the administrative 
competencies to the OFCOM. 
 
 
4.1.1 The Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM) 
 
The OFCOM was created in 1992 based on the reform of the legislation on telegraphs and 
telephone correspondence (LCTT). Located within the Federal Department of Environment, 
Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC), the OFCOM attends to communications 
and IT matters for the Federal Council and the ComCom. It also has an advisory and 
coordination function for the public and the policymakers.  
 
Two major tasks were assigned to the OFCOM: to regulate the radio and television sectors, 
and to establish the conditions needed to open up the telecommunications market. Today the 
OFCOM oversees radio and television, radiocommunications, telecommunications services 
and telecommunications installations. It has the duty to promote efficient competition and to 
guarantee that market forces can freely work. It also guarantees that basic services are 
provided in all parts of the country and for all sections of the population. While the ComCom 
is the statutory regulatory body, the OFCOM is the administrative executor of the ComCom 
and the Federal Council through the DETEC. 
 
The OFCOM is divided into five sections:  
1. Resource and Organization 
2. Radio and Television 
3. Telecom Services 
4. Licenses and Equipment 
5. Frequency Management 
 
The staff of the OFCOM for the five sections total 298 employees with 32% of women and 
68% of men. 23% of the employees have a technical education, 18% have a commercial 
education, 15% have studied law, 4% have a diploma in management of enterprises, and 
37% come from various professional backgrounds. The Telecommunications Services 
division has about 50 employees. 
 
The OFCOM budget is financed by a state fixed budget and by fees. The OFCOM has the 
prerogative of collecting fees for frequencies or numbering, but the benefits from UMTS 
licenses were allocated to the State budget. In 2001, the costs of the Telecommunications 
Services section were CHF 19,3 millions (13 millions EUR) for a fee amount of CHF 16.7 
millions (11.3 millions EUR) which means a costs-coverage rate of 87%.  
                                                          
19  Art. 58 LTC 
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Table 6: Competencies of the Swiss authorities in telecommunications services (LTC Chapter 2)  
Administrative competency 
Statutory competency 
Delegation 
Article
LTC CF DETEC FCC OFCOM AB FSCr
Obligation to notify for providing 
telecommunication services, which do not request 
a license 
42        
Licensing authority 5          
Possible delegation of certain tasks 52      
Interconnection (IC): Lay down the principles 111        
IC: Ensure the capacity to communicate between 
all users of services which are part of the universal 
service 
112 1)   2)    
IC: Fix the conditions at 1st instance 113       
IC: Fix the conditions on appeal 114         
Obligation to provide leased lines 12       
Obligation for the OFCOM to inform 13        
Universal service (US): Granting the license 14 + 5       
US: Content and adaptations 161+3         
Scope of the US: Fix the detailed rules 162      
US: Fix the quality criteria 171         
US: Fix upper limits for the prices 172       
US: Ensure that it is provided for all sections of the 
population and all over the country 
181        
US: Obligation to provide US 182       
Territorial scope: Regulations of the procedure 183          
OFCOM: Federal Office of Communications ComCom: federal Communications Commission 
FSCr: Federal Supreme Court AB: Appeals Board 
FC: Federal Council 
DETEC: Federal Dept. for Environment, Transport, 
Energy and Communications 
Source: ComCom 
1  The Federal Council may prescribe necessary interfaces to access these services according to International 
standards 
2  The office edicts technical and administrative prescriptions  
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4.2 Ministry (DETEC) 
 
The Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications 
(DETEC) has only few competencies in the field of Telecommunications. The reasons for this 
are, on the one hand, the direct prerogative of the Federal Council in the decision making 
process, and on the other hand, the delegation of most competencies to its Office (OFCOM). 
However, the Ministry has the competence to fix the detailed rules for the universal service as 
far as connections outside built-up areas are concerned. The Ministry also fixes the amount 
of administrative charges with respect to telecommunications and defines the budget for the 
sector’s regulation.   
 
The Telecommunications Law designates the Ministry as the prosecution authority and 
judgment in connection with penalties. However, the prosecution, judgment and enforcement 
of law delegated to the OFCOM.  
 
4.3 Federal Council  
 
The Telecommunications Law of 1997 (LTC) attributes a wide range of statutory 
competencies directly to the Federal Council. Switzerland’s executive authority has the 
statutory competencies to regulate the interconnection principles, the universal service 
content and adaptations20, the US quality criteria, the procedure regulation of the territorial 
scope, the detailed rules for addressing resource implementation, and issues concerning vital 
national interests. The Federal Council determines the amount of licensing fees.  
 
The institutional framework shows that there is a somewhat direct link between the Federal 
Council and the OFCOM in charge of the administrative implementation of most of the 
executive’s decisions. The Federal Council holds an important ruling control over the DETEC 
and the OFCOM, which are consequently both cut from independent regulation. The only 
independent regulation body is the ComCom which is fully autonomous in its decisions. The 
only control of the Executive over this body is the nomination of the seven commission 
members, who once nominated have no obligation towards the Federal Council.  
 
4.4 Competition Authority  
 
4.4.1 The Competition Commission (ComCo) 
 
The Swiss competition policy is based on the Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restraints of 
Competition21. Its aim is to promote competition by opposing possible harmful effects of 
restraints of competition and to achieve a market economy in which the enterprises may use 
their resources efficiently and react to changes quickly.  
 
The Act on Cartels includes three kinds of restraints of competition (art. 4 Acart): Agreements 
and concerted practices (art. 5 Acart), abuse of dominant positions (art. 7 Acart) and 
concentrations of enterprises (art. 10 Acart). The application of the Act is the duty of the 
                                                          
20  Implementation delegated to the DETEC 
21  Act on Cartels, Acart, October 6, 1995.  
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ComCo and its Secretariat. The ComCo is an independent federal authority. Its activities are 
organized according to three economic branches: Product Markets, Services and 
Infrastructure. The Board of the Commission together with a service of the Secretariat are 
responsible for each division. One of the main duties of the ComCo is to address 
recommendations to the authorities to promote effective competition (art. 45). Often, 
impediments to competition are due to governmental interventions in the markets – e.g. 
subsidies, protectionism, and unequal rules – which is why sometimes the ComCo contests a 
Government’s decision. Such situations reveal how tensions can appear between the 
objectives of the executive’s power and regulation rules. In the telecom sector, the 
competition regulator has no real friction point with the government objectives. However, as 
the Federal Department of Finance holds the majority of Swisscom’s shares, conflicts can 
appear between competition objectives and the incumbent revenue objectives. 
 
4.4.2 Collaboration between ComCo, ComCom & OFCOM 
 
In the field of telecommunications market regulation, the regulatory bodies (ComCom & 
OFCOM) have no competencies over competition matters, except for interconnection price 
issues22. The OFCOM acts as an instruction authority when it comes to interconnection 
disputes, but the ComCom renders the final decision. The OFCOM also carries out 
settlement negotiations, implements provisional measurements and consults the Competition 
Commission when it decides on questions of dominant positions23. 
 
The OFCOM collaborates with the ComCo in the field of interconnections issues. According 
to the Act on Telecommunications24, negotiation primacy applies and if no agreement 
between the parties concerned can be reached within three months, the ComCom decides on 
proposal of the OFCOM on the interconnection conditions. However, only enterprises having 
a dominant position may be obliged to provide interconnection at prices based on costs. 
Consequently, the ComCo has the task to assess if there is any market dominance and to 
bring it to the attention of the ComCom and respectively the OFCOM. Conversely, the 
ComCo consults the ComCom or the OFCOM in telecommunication matters that are not laid 
out in specific regulations that fall within the scope of the Act on Cartels. Therefore, the 
ComCom and the ComCo have established from the beginning a close contact to ensure an 
efficient cooperation. 
 
In Switzerland, as the role of the ComCo is determinant in the field of competition within the 
telecommunications market, the legislators would not create sector specific competition 
surveillance. Regulation of the market based on the Federal Act on Cartels and Other 
Restraints of Competition, is considered as the most pragmatic solution for Switzerland’s 
telecom market.  
 
This issue of competition surveillance attributions has already been widely discussed in 
Europe and most countries have adopted the idea of sector specific regulation, especially in 
                                                          
22  The ComCom is in charge of interconnection surveillance. It delegates the administrative competency to the 
OFCOM.  
23  Art. 11 par. 3 Act on Telecommunications 
24  Art. 11 
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the field of market definition and abuse of dominance matters. For Swiss legislators, market 
competition issues have to be regulated by the Competition Authority, while the independent 
telecommunications regulation body should regulate sector specific matters such as 
interconnection. The LTC reform project does not contain any changes over this structure 
and there is no objective to give significant competition power to the new independent 
regulatory body.  
 
4.5 Price Supervisor 25 
 
The function of the Office of the Price Supervisor is to observe price developments, to 
prevent or eliminate abusive price agreements and to inform the public about its activities.  
As in any other market sector, the Price Supervisor can make decisions in the field of 
telecommunications pricing. Since the liberalization of 1998, the Price Supervisor initiated 
three actions in the field of telecommunications.  
 
First, it issued a decision against Swisscom and its pricing of telephone addresses. In 1998, 
the Price Supervisor refused the substantial price increase of the telephone addresses 
market. Swisscom submitted an appeal to the Appeals Board, which refused the case.  
 
The second case occurred with an interconnection issue in 1998 as well. The Price 
Supervisor obligated Swisscom to render a more detailed report on the costs for 
interconnection provided to an alternative operator. After trying an appeal, Swisscom had to 
accept the decision.  
 
The third cased occurred in 2001 with the revision of the Ordinance on Telecommunications. 
On Swisscom’s demand, the Federal Council looked into the possibility of raising the price of 
the fixed-line subscription from 23.45 to 29 CHF. The price supervisor was consulted on the 
matter and advised the Federal Council to maintain the price at the same level.  
 
4.6 Judiciary  
 
In the Swiss telecommunications sector, there are several appeal bodies according to the 
institution that issues the decision. Complaints against a regulatory decision from the 
ComCom can be addressed to the Federal Supreme Court only. Decisions taken by the 
OFCOM can be appealed before the DETEC’s sector specific appeals body and in second 
and last instance before the Federal Supreme Court. The DETEC Appeals Commission takes 
its judicial decisions independently, but is subject to the surveillance of the Federal Council 
and superintendence by the Federal Assembly. Decisions taken by the ComCo can be 
appealed before the Competition Appeals Board and then the Federal Supreme Court.  
 
As telecommunications regulation works on ex-post principles, decisions of the judiciary 
authorities have a high level of importance for the future telecom landscape especially since 
legal actions have a suspensory effect.  
 
                                                          
25  „Monsieur Prix“ 
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Since 1998, 24 decisions of the regulator have been appealed before the Federal Court. The 
regulator has lost 6 of these cases, i.e., 25%. In 5 out of six cases, the Federal Court 
suspended provisional measures imposed by the regulator in interconnection disputes. By 
doing so, the Federal Court considerably restricted the power of the regulator and imposed 
an important burden on the plaintiffs, in other words, the new entrants. The sixth case in 
which the regulator’s decision was overruled constitutes a particularly sensitive one, as it laid 
down jurisprudence for a narrow interpretation of the LTC. Not only did it challenge the 
regulator’s authority on an important matter; it also questioned the implementation of an 
important objective of telecommunications policy in the country: the establishment of effective 
competition.  
 
This case is the well known Commcare vs. Swisscom case. After the ComCom reached its 
decision on the procedure concerning leased lines and transmission media26, each of the two 
parties submitted a complaint against the ComCom decision to the Federal Supreme Court. 
Commcare had the opinion that the ComCom had appraised the situation regarding 
transmission media incorrectly. On the other hand, Swisscom contested the obligation to 
provide leased lines under interconnection conditions and applied for suspensory effect of the 
complaint. On December 15, 2000 the Federal Court granted suspensory effect and finally, in 
its far-reaching decision of October 3, 2001, approved Swisscom’s appeal and rejected that 
of Commcare. In its judgment, the Federal Court concluded that neither leased lines nor 
transmission media could be subject to the interconnection regime, since there was no 
adequate legal foundation for this. In this judgment, the Federal Court already expressed 
itself quite in detail on unbundling issues.  
 
According to the Federal Supreme Court, it was up to the Federal Council or Parliament to 
clarify what falls under the interconnection regime by means of corresponding amendment of 
the laws and decrees. The leased line prices of the market-dominant providers could 
therefore not be regulated. This decision resulted in a financial burden on Swisscom’s 
competitors who are forced to rely on such lines. In its decision, the Federal Court also 
critically limited the ComCom’s freedom of action to impose a pro-competitive interpretation 
of the Law on Telecommunications. 
 
The consequences of this case went thus far beyond the mere facts which it referred to. It 
demonstrated the contradictions of the legal and institutional framework, and occasioned 
considerable legal uncertainty for new entrants. As for the regulator, it constituted a serious 
disavowal.    
 
In 2003, the situation was cleared, at least from a legal point of view, with the decree of the 
Federal Council, adopted on February 26, 2003 that put leased line,  bit stream access, 
shared line access and full access unbundling variants under the interconnection regime as 
of 1 April 2003.  
 
However, this experience has shown that in the absence of a clear and exhaustive legal 
framework, the judicial powers have the ultimate power and opportunity to interpret the law 
and can thus rule against the regulator’s action.  
                                                          
26  Decision reached on October 2, 2000. 
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4.7 Owner of the Incumbent 
 
For the moment, the majority of Swisscom Group shares are still owned by the Swiss 
Government. The Department of Finance owns 62.7% of the company while the remaining 
shares are publicly traded. As of October 1, 2001, Swisscom’s market capitalization was 21.5 
billion EUR.27 Even if, in the first years of liberalization, Swisscom’s management was in favor 
of being independent from the government, it is nowadays not a top priority. Some strategists 
even argue that the current situation is more profitable for the company than a larger 
privatization. At the moment, there is no further plan to remove the state from the company 
control, mainly because of political conservatism. Moreover, such a perspective would need a 
law review because the state ownership is guaranteed in the LTC with a minimum of 50% 
plus one of Swisscom shares.  
 
4.8 Competing Operators  
 
Two main associations, VIT (Verband Inside Telecom) and SICTA (Swiss Information and 
Communications Technology Association), represent the telecom operators on a nation-wide 
basis. They mainly work to promote the telecom industry’s interests in the political field, and 
to build a sector network in order to be an interlocutor among other industries’ interests.  
 
VIT is the telecom association representing the incumbent’s competitors. It was founded to 
defend the new entrants against the historical operator. The association works as a lobby and 
is part of the consultation process in case of law reform and amendments. The VIT also 
represents the competing operators during negotiations with the incumbent.  
 
SICTA is the Swiss association for Information Technology industries, which includes all the 
telecom players. As the incumbent is a member, they do not work on issues such as 
interconnection and pricing problems. SITCA works on issues such as health and security of 
mobile telephony, the LTC reform, IT development and promotion, and also participates 
actively in the federal consultation working groups on telecom issues.  
 
5. Regulatory functions 
 
5.1 Allocation of scarce resources 
 
5.1.1 Frequencies 
Frequencies are managed at the federal level in the National Frequency Allocation Plan. The 
statutory competency on the National Frequency Allocation Plan belongs to the ComCom, 
but the OFCOM is in charge of its application, as stipulated in the Law on 
Telecommunications28. Governmental and commercial uses of frequency are both 
determined in the National Plan, which presents the frequency spectrum allocated to different 
telecommunications applications.  
 
                                                          
27  Source: Swisscom, 2002 
28  LTC, Art. 25. para. 2 
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The National Frequency Allocation Plan is periodically adapted to needs based on new 
international prescriptions. The last National Plan became effective on July 1, 2002.  
 
5.1.2 Rights-of-way 
There are no major problems regarding rights-of-way in the Swiss regulatory framework. All 
the licenses granted include strict conditions relating to obligations on area planning and the 
protection of the environment, as well as the co-ordination and co-use of sites. Concerns of 
the Swiss population regarding non-ionizing radiation were taken into consideration. This 
issue is regulated by the decree on protection from non-ionizing radiation, which became 
effective on February 1, 2000. The Federal Court stipulates that the decree takes into 
account the principle of prevention in the law on protection of the environment. The 
application of the decree belongs to the cantonal authorities, and thus the telecom regulatory 
body has no competence concerning this issue.  
 
5.2 Enhancing competition 
 
5.2.1 Licensing  
Any operator providing a telecommunications service involving extensive independent use of 
telecommunications installations used for transmission must have a license (LTC Art. 4). 
Operators who do mere reselling of services only need to register with the OFCOM. The 
licensing authority is the ComCom, but it may delegate its responsibility for certain tasks to 
the OFCOM.  
 
There are three types of licenses:  
• Licenses for any telecom services provider who operates major parts of the 
communications installations itself.  
• Licenses for any service provider using the frequency spectrum in order to regulate the 
allocation of a resource (frequencies) which is limited.  
• Universal service license, which ensures that any subscriber within a licensed area has 
access to a number of services of predetermined quality and at a maximum price fixed by 
the Federal Council. This type of license is distinguished from the other two because it 
does not confer a right, but imposes an obligation to provide a service.  
 
3G Licensing 
The ComCom auctioned UMTS licenses on December 6, 2000, for CHF 205 million (€ 138.5 
million). Of the ten initial candidates, six withdrew, some on the very day before the auction 
started. The award process was therefore interrupted and the reasons for the withdrawals 
were examined, however, there was no indication of collusion between the candidates. In 
order to avoid delays in the introduction of this new technology and to guarantee legal 
certainty, the ComCom decided to proceed in accordance with the existing rules. The award 
procedure was completed with the granting of licenses at the end of January 2001 to Orange, 
TDC Switzerland, 3G Mobile and Swisscom. There are no UMTS services properly ready to 
operate yet, and one of the license subscribers (3G Mobile) abandoned the UMTS project.  
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5.2.2 Granting access to infrastructure for new entrants 
 
• Interconnection rates and agreements 
The interconnection regime, which is defined in the Telecommunications Law in the article 
11, makes it possible to link networks and guarantees user access to the services of 
alternative operators. Paragraph 1 sets the rule regarding dominant providers’ 
interconnection obligations: Providers of telecommunications services that have a dominant 
position in the market must (undertake to) provide interconnection for other providers without 
discrimination and in accordance with the principles of a transparent and cost-related price 
policy. They must state the conditions and prices separately for each of their interconnection 
services. The Federal Council shall lay down the principles governing interconnection. The 
law envisages that operators who occupy a dominant position in the market must guarantee 
this interconnection and that the partners will first negotiate for three months29. If they do not 
reach an agreement within this period, the ComCom may lay down interconnection conditions 
and prices.  
 
Since January 1, 2000, interconnection prices have been fixed in accordance with new 
principles which the Federal Council laid down in the decree on telecommunication services 
and which are based on the Long Run Incremental Costs (LRIC) model. Consequently, prices 
are calculated by the costs incurred directly by interconnection services, on the current basis 
of the additional long-term costs generated by the use of the infrastructure.  
 
In the year 2000, six procedures were in progress regarding interconnection agreements. The 
procedures concerned leased lines, transmission resources, unbundling of the local loop, 
mobile termination prices and interconnection prices based on the “Long Run Incremental 
Cost (LRIC) model of calculation. After negotiations, most of the telecom services providers 
reached an agreement with Swisscom on new interconnection rates, corresponding to the 
new calculation model. However, after failing to negotiate, two providers submitted an 
application, in order to have the interconnection prices fixed by the ComCom.   
 
• Leased lines 
According to the Telecommunications Law, the licensing authority may require license-
holders within the meaning of Article 4(1) to provide leased lines in the area covered by their 
license, in accordance with international standards and at cost-related prices30.  
 
In October 2000, the ComCom ordered Swisscom to provide local access to leased lines at 
LRIC-based rates, and on a non-discriminatory basis. Swisscom appealed this decision, and 
the Federal Court ruled one year later (October 2001) that the ComCom did not have the 
authority to take such a decision. Because of this decision by the Federal Court, the 
ComCom sees an urgent need for legislative action against the high prices of leased lines31.   
 
                                                          
29  “The primacy of negotiations” 
30  LTC, Art. 12.  
31  This was done recently (26.02.2003) with the Federal Council’s decision to introduce the obligation to 
unbundle the last mile in the Ordinance on Telecommunications services.  
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Despite the cost-orientation and international standard requirements laid down in the LTC, 
the rates charged in Switzerland for access to leased lines are still very heterogeneous and 
can be high in the regions where Swisscom possesses the absolute monopoly over this 
service. In the main metropolitan areas where alternative operators are competing for this 
service, the incumbent's prices have already been forced to decrease. As a result, in 
international comparison (OECD), prices for leased lines in Switzerland are considered low 
with respect to purchasing power parity. In the OECD Communications Outlook 2003, 
Switzerland ranks just behind the Nordic countries as far as the prices of the OECD basket of 
national leased line charges are concerned (August 2002).  
 
• Unbundling of the local loop 
The local loop was expected to be unbundled by the year 2000, but that has not happened 
yet. Swisscom still has a full monopoly in this market segment.  
 
In February 2003, the Federal Council decided to break Swisscom’s local loop monopoly by 
changing the ordinance on Telecommunications Services and at the same time through a 
change of the Telecommunications Law. The reason why the government wants to use both 
legal options to introduce local loop unbundling is that neither option is certain to bring an end 
to Swisscom’s monopoly. The ordinance option is a way of implementing Local Loop 
Unbundling (LLU) rapidly, but runs the risk of being appealed by Swisscom with a possible 
overruling of the Federal Court. This could lead to the definitive rejection of the process by 
the Federal Court. The option of establishing LLU through a change in the 
Telecommunications Law would then be necessary, a procedure that could take two to three 
years. As it is mostly probable that Swisscom will use all resources possible to resist to the 
LLU, the government launched both options at the same time. If Swisscom opposes 
resistance at the ordinance level, the LLU should wait for the law modification procedure, 
which is not expected to be passed through by the parliament before 2004.  
 
This decision of the Federal Council to impose unbundling by means of an Ordinance comes 
as no surprise after the repeated efforts of the Swiss regulator to introduce unbundling within 
the framework of the current LTC. In November 2000 already, the ComCom issued an 
injunction and ordered the incumbent to immediately implement bit stream access and draft a 
full unbundling Reference Interconnection Offer (“RIO”)32. The Federal Court overruled this 
injunction in October 2001. In spite of this, the ComCom has continued to energetically 
promote unbundling as a key step towards greater competition and towards strengthening 
Switzerland's position as a business location, but the Federal Court claimed that the 
ComCom did not have authority over those issues. With the new legal provisions, the 
authority of ComCom should no longer be challenged in this respect.  
 
 
5.2.3 Facilitating access to customers for new companies  
 
• Call-by-call carrier selection and carrier pre-selection  
The ComCom decided through decree to make the call-by-call option (choosing a supplier for 
national and international calls) available for Swiss consumers together with the liberalization 
                                                          
32  Source: CompTel, 2003, Washington 
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of telecom sector. This first step towards an open telecom market place came into force on 
January 1, 1998. 
 
Carrier pre-selection for fixed telephony should have come into force definitively for all 
subscribers on January 1, 1998, but was deferred until April 1, 1999, because of the 
difficulties encountered with certain Swisscom telephone exchanges. The year 1998 was, 
thus, dedicated to the preparation for the national and international links to be pre-selected.   
 
• Number portability 
The technical and administrative specifications for the implementation of operator number 
portability are set by a Commission’s decree amended in August 1999 that became effective 
on October 1, 1999. This ComCom decree imposed an obligation on operators to guarantee 
portability from January 1, 2000. However, delays occurred in the preparatory work, also 
because of the Y2K IT problems which might have arisen with changeover to the new 
millennium, and number portability was finally introduced successfully on March 1, 2000. 
Consumers responded quickly and in large number to this new service available. In 2000, 
some 50,000 numbers – mostly mobile numbers – were ported to a different 
telecommunication service provider33.  
 
5.2.4 Guarantying stable and fair market conditions 
 
• Legal certainty 
Legal certainty is an essential prerequisite for the sound development of the 
telecommunications market in general, and for the new entrants on the market in particular.  
 
According to the LTC, the Swiss NRA has the competencies required to enforce and 
guarantee equal market conditions for all players. The Telecommunications Law (LTC + 
ordinances) sets up relatively comprehensive rules and mechanisms of regulation. However, 
because of the Supreme Court’s ruling options, the Swiss telecom competitors are facing 
strong legal uncertainty.  
 
First, as we have seen earlier, there have been 6 cases (out of 24 submitted to the 
appreciation of the Supreme Court) in which the regulator’s decisions in favor of the new 
entrants have been overruled or suspended. Although 6 cases are not that many, they still 
show that the Swiss legislation leaves room for interpretation, in which the judicial power has 
the ultimate power of arbitrage. In particular, it demonstrates hesitation on behalf of the Swiss 
authorities between a competitive telecom market and an incumbent monopoly status. For 
new entrants, this has led to strong legal uncertainty over the past 3 years. The uncertain 
outcomes as well as the length of the procedures have been a particularly heavy burden on 
new companies. The situation should be partially cleared with the Federal Council’s decree 
on the unbundling of the local loop, at least with regards to that particular issue.  
 
Second, the enforcement mechanisms should be much clearer with serious penalties 
attached to none complying with the rules.  
                                                          
33  2000 Annual Report of the ComCom.  
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• Sanction Power 
According to the Telecommunication Law (LTC), the regulatory authorities – namely the 
ComCom, the OFCOM and the ComCo – have the ability to fine companies whenever they 
do not respect telecommunications legislation, for instance when they show anti-competitive 
or discriminatory behavior or when they do not provide or provide falsified requested 
information. 
 
If we look at the actual supervisory procedures initiated by the regulator, we notice that only a 
small minority of all procedures have lead to fines for the incriminated companies. Most of the 
time, litigations are resolved through advertisements, changes brought into the licenses and 
the confiscation of benefits realized through illegal practices. Between 1998 and 2003, fines 
have been mainly addressed to the incumbent, for discriminatory behavior or illegal use of 
data that the incumbent possesses to provide interconnection. Even though the amount of 
the fines can be rather important, many people in the Swiss telecommunications sector argue 
that their amount is not dissuasive, especially given Swisscom’s financial strength. This is a 
recurrent problem in many of the observed countries, where fines are sometimes dissuasive 
for new entrants but rarely for the Incumbent operators.  
 
5.3 Guarantying public service 
 
• Universal service  
 
The Telecommunication Law (LTC) of 1997 lay down the universal service principles. The 
Federal Council is competent to adjust the content of the universal service regularly, 
according to changes in technology and the needs of society and economy. The Federal 
Council also determines the maximum prices and quality requirements relating to the 
services.  
 
After liberalization, Swisscom has been designated as the universal service provider for a 
transitional period of five years. By 2001, the regulator considered whether or not to have one 
main national license for Swisscom, or several regional licenses split between several 
facilities-based providers. The ComCom concluded that for the moment a single license is 
considered as the best choice. In 2002, the universal service license was re-allocated to 
Swisscom, the only candidate for the license. In case several operators are candidate for the 
universal service license, the license is to be granted to the applicant who has submitted the 
best bid, according to the terms of the LTC.34 The operator assuring universal services can 
receive compensation for the provision of US if it constitutes a financial burden. Until now, 
Swisscom has not requested any compensation.  
 
5.3.2 Consumer protection and quality control  
Consumer protection is not a major task for the Swiss regulator as the quality requirements 
for universal service are precisely verbalized in the LTC. In Switzerland, the philosophy 
behind a good quality of telecom services is based on competition. In order to obtain the best 
technology and the best choice for consumers, the Swiss regulatory system mainly focuses 
                                                          
34  1997 LTC, Art. 19. 
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on assuring a competitive market place, believing that competition is the best way to obtain a 
good quality of services. Of course, Swiss regulation does not neglect the basic surveillance 
of services provided, i.e. failure in interoperability obligations and abuse of prices.  
 
The NRA does not provide specific consumers information on its website – such as tariff 
comparison, services comparison, availability of technology, quality standards – and refers to 
private consumers association when the public asks for such information.  
6. Evaluation of the regulatory system  
6.1 Assessment of the NRA 
 
6.1.1 Resources and Expertise 
Both regulatory bodies – OFCOM and ComCom – are known to have well-qualified staff that 
has the expertise required for regulating telecom specific issues. However, many people in 
the sector claim that the regulator should have a larger legal department in order to deal with 
the numerous appeal cases, often initiated by Swisscom. Moreover, there are concerns about 
the durability of the actual system in which a few leading key people (participants to the 
foundation of the institutions in 1998) have a major influence. Even though from a formal 
point a few, the personalities of the people working at the OFCOM and ComCom should not 
be an issue, in practice however, these personalities precisely seem to have a major impact.  
 
Indeed, many people in the sector believe that the current level of expertise and collaboration 
between OFCOm and ComCom may be challenged in the future with the relief of some of the 
principal actors of the system. In particular, concerns exist about potential conflicts of interest 
arising between the ComCom and the OFCOM. At the time of writing however, collaboration 
and expertise seem to be good.  
 
In terms of financial resources, the fact that the OFCOM’s budget is in majority35 financed by 
the private sector through fees seems to have a rather positive impact on the whole system.  
 
6.1.2 Independence vis-à-vis political interests and transparency  
Both regulatory bodies – OFCOM and ComCom – benefit from great independence vis-à-vis 
political interests. Even if the OFCOM depends on the DETEC, it works as an independent 
government agency and has a large range of competencies for which no approval from the 
Ministry is necessary. Regarding the ComCom, the seven Commissioners have a total 
autonomy for regulating the sector. The only political control is the nomination of the 
Commissioners by the Federal Council. However, indirect political pressure over the 
ComCom can occur through the judicial authorities who may act as a threat to disciple the 
regulator.   
As for transparency, both regulatory bodies have the reputation to release broad and good 
information to the industry and the population. The OFCOM is in favor of consultative 
procedures when new telecom issue arises and prompts the set-up of working groups with 
representatives of the telecom providers concerned.  
                                                          
35  The fees amount represent 87% of the OFCOM budget.  
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6.1.3 Efficacy and credibility  
 
The Swiss telecom regulatory authorities enjoy a good reputation of efficacy and credibility 
vis-à-vis the public and the industry. They are recognized, also at the international level, to 
exploit the best of their resources in order to improve the sector's functioning. Both regulation 
authorities have worked together to make the Swiss telecom sector a dynamic competitive 
marketplace. They are recognized as having no privileged attitude towards the incumbent. 
On the contrary, they are considered to work hard to make the market viable and attractive 
for new entrants. However, as we will examine more deeply in the conclusion, these efforts to 
make Switzerland an interesting marketplace – for both the industry and the consumers – 
have been somewhat restrained by the judicial authorities and their interpretation of the 
sometimes unclear LTC language.   
 
6.2 Flexibility of the whole regulatory system 
 
The Swiss telecom regulatory framework elaborated in 1997 was intentionally and explicitly 
drawn to allow a maximum of adaptability with regard to future developments. The flexibility 
of the LTC showed that the legislator:  
 
1. could not (did not want to) predict the development of the telecom sector in the future 
 
2. wanted to leave room for the OFCOM and ComCom to statue on the necessity to 
complement the LTC with Ordinances  
 
3. wanted to avoid overregulation and leave ample room for market mechanisms to 
develop 
 
While the intended flexibility indeed allowed the LTC to be completed with Ordinances when 
the need arose, the initial intention to leave room of maneuver to the regulator turned out to 
be a risky enterprise. In reality, it happened more than once that the fuzziness of 
telecommunications legislation benefited more to the Incumbent operator and the judicial 
power than to the regulator, in particular with respect to the ability of the regulator to rule on 
interconnection issues. As we have seen before, the regulator has been confronted with a 
serious disavowal while attempting to regulate interconnection prices and the unbundling of 
the local loop. According to the Federal Court, the regulator did not have the legal backup to 
statue on that issue. Flexibility thus turned out to bring uncertainty. Recently, the Federal 
Council has completed the legislation by introducing the obligation to unbundle in the  
Ordinance on Telecommunications services, thus addressing this question of legal void.  
 
During the review process of the actual telecom legislation, there was also a debate on the 
opportunity to introduce ex-ante price regulation, considering that negotiations between 
operators were often characterized by asymmetric bargaining power and consequent long 
procedures for ex-post intervention by the regulator or the judicial powers. The idea was to 
empower the regulator by authorizing ex-ante regulation whenever market dominance has 
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been recorded, following the example of the EU countries. In the end however, the Federal 
Council renounced to introduce ex ante regulation in the law.  
 
All in all, the Swiss regulatory framework for telecommunications can be considered as rather 
flexible, and it is currently being revised in light of the developments that have occurred 
during the past 5 years and the new European framework for telecommunications legislation. 
However, we have seen that in the past, too much ‘flexibility’ can also lead to imprecision and 
consequent legal void or institutional problems.  
7. Outcome performance indicators 
7.1 Competition 
 
• Number of operators on the market 
Since the 1998 liberalization, a good number of new entrants have been providing telecom 
services in Switzerland. According to the Telecommunications Act, the core of the 
liberalization took the form of an obligation to grant interconnection to new entrants. However, 
the incumbent is not yet complying with the principles to provide full access to the end-users, 
as well as to provide interconnection to the new entrants without discrimination and in 
accordance with the principles of transparency and cost-oriented price policy. Both regulatory 
bodies have been working hard to encourage competition, but they had to face resistance at 
various levels.  
 
Nonetheless, Swisscom witnessed the market entry of strong competitors such as diAx and 
Sunrise. In 2001, diAx merged with Sunrise, both bought out by the Danish operator TDC. 
The result has been an effective duopoly situation for fixed-line services, although Swisscom 
still dominates the market.36 Other operators such as Tele2 have also gained some market 
shares.  
 
In the mobile market, three telecom providers share the market. Orange and Sunrise together 
gained a third of the market by the end of 2000. Competitors made constant efforts to 
increase their own coverage infrastructure and their mobile service quality for individual and 
business consumers. In addition to the three initial mobile providers, Tele2 Mobile is offering 
MVNO services (Mobile Virtual Network Operator) and as such, is the first MVNO in 
Switzerland. Tele2 is specialized in pre-paid services and resells services on the Swisscom 
Mobile network, on the offer available on the Swisscom Natel tariff, including international 
roaming, dual-band reception and information services. By the end of 2002, Tele2 had a 
market share of approximately 0.5%.  
 
As for internet service providers, Switzerland counted 113 operators in 2000. Among them 59 
via PSTN or ISDN connections, 55 via cable modem, 42 via xDSL, 2 with satellite internet 
access and 27 by other means37.  
 
                                                          
36  World Markets Research Centre, Telecom Country Report: Switzerland, 28.1.2003 
37 OFCOM, Statistique officielle des télécommunications 2001 
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As a general rule, entry on the Swiss market is easy and quick, administrative and financial 
obligations are kept down to a minimum. With the 1998 liberalization, the Swiss market 
rapidly became very attractive for new entrants which lead to an increase in the number of 
providers as well as in the number of telecom services. Even if some factors of this success 
are linked with the specific Swiss market configuration38, the most important factors are the 
regulator’s will and ability to stimulate a positive market environment. The two regulatory 
bodies have worked together in order to transform the telecom sector into a dynamic 
marketplace and reached this objective in a very short period of time. One of the strategies of 
the regulatory system – especially the ComCom – has been to keep the Swiss regulatory 
regime in line with the EU directives. However, there is resistance – such as those against 
LLU for instance – from the incumbent and also political tendencies against the 
implementation of competition at all levels and for all services. This situation removes some 
of the legal and regulatory certainty, which competitors operating in other EU countries can 
enjoy.  
 
• Choice for the consumers in terms of operators 
In Switzerland, various operators are providing services for every fixed service – except for 
the last mile – as shown in the graphs below.  
 
Figure 4: % of population that can choose between different operators for fixed telephony local calls 
  
Source: WIK Consult Auszug aus dem 8. Implementation Report der EU -erweitert um die Schweiz, 2003 
 
Figure 5: % of population that can choose between different operators for fixed telephony domestic long 
distance and international  
 
Source: WIK Consult Auszug aus dem 8. Implementation Report der EU -erweitert um die Schweiz, 2003 
 
At the time of writing, the Swiss consumers have a carrier choice for all fixed telephony 
market segments thanks to carrier pre-selection introduced in April 1999 by the regulatory 
                                                          
38  Many areas with highly concentrated population; the Swiss standard of living 
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authorities. As for the last mile, Swiss consumers have no other choice but to subscribe to 
Swisscom’s service.  
 
Indeed, despite the pro-competitive work of the regulatory authorities, the Swiss telecom 
sector has for long been hampered by strong legal and political blockage against full 
liberalization. Until April 2003, unbundling of the local loop was not possible, i.e. competitors 
had no possibility of using their own technology in order to offer broadband services adapted 
to their own customers’ needs. They were constrained to resell the incumbent’s product, 
which considerably reduced the choice for users. The situation of leased lines was also 
unsatisfactory for new comers on the market. The lack of competitive regulation pressure in 
these areas had far-ranging negative economic consequences and lead to a restricted 
freedom of choice for end-users.  
 
Following the regulator’s recommendations and under pressure of Swisscom’s competitors, 
the Federal Council put an end to this situation and enforced local loop unbundling as of April 
2003. The Federal Council also decided to put leased lines under the interconnection regime. 
As a result, alternative operators should be able to have a direct access to their customers, 
which means that the Swiss telecommunication users will have more choice in the future. The 
development of fixed voice telephony over cable could also increase the consumers’ choice. 
When this technology is ready, about 50 % of the Swiss households (Cablecom customers) 
will have the opportunity to choose to receive voice telephony via cable services.  
 
All in all, the Swiss regulatory authorities have been actively engaged in order to implement 
all the elements necessary to obtain a good quality for telecom services, including a fair 
amount of choice for the consumers.  
 
• Market shares of the Incumbent 
As in the other liberalized telecom markets, the market share of Swisscom has decreased 
after liberalization. The mobile, the long-distance and the international markets are – as in the 
other countries – the most competitive ones. The lack of competitors providing full access 
services to the consumers is due to the absence of local loop unbundling. Consequently, 
Swisscom owns almost all fixed access lines for telephony except for those that CATV 
operators have upgraded for telephony services. The main competitor to Swisscom is TDC 
Switzerland, also known as Sunrise, which has an approximate market share of 10% of 
revenues.  
As Swisscom owns most access lines, it also controls the domestic access leased line 
market. There are competitors in Switzerland using capacity rented from Swisscom to offer 
data services, but again Swisscom has the majority market share, particularly for domestic 
services. Due to Switzerland’s role as a financial and international organization center, global 
providers have a presence in the international data market. 
Swisscom also dominates the mobile sector, with its mobile subsidiary accounting for 62.9% 
of total subscribers. The Swiss population has the choice between 4 mobile operators of 
which one VMNO. The incumbent had a monopoly until 1998, but since then the new 
entrants have succeeded in conquering about 40% of the market.  
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For the internet, the incumbent’s ISP Bluewin, has the majority of Internet connections, 
followed by far by its main competitor TDC. For broadband services, Bluewin has the majority 
of DSL subscribers in Switzerland with 56% of all DSL subscriptions. Swisscom owns the 
totality of subscriber lines and offers wholesale DSL to Bluewin and to its competitors. In 
addition Cablecom, which covers mainly urban areas, offers cable modem service.  
 
As the Swiss telecom regulation is not based on pro-active practice or asymmetric regulation 
principles, but rather on competition promotion, there are still service areas where the 
incumbent holds a dominant market share position. However, dynamic competition in the 
fixed-line services and the mobile telephony have made the incumbent’s market share 
decrease dramatically since the start of liberalization. This shows that the Swiss regulatory 
authorities, by promoting a competitive marketplace, have greatly helped competitors to 
evolve towards a viable situation, in spite of Swisscom’s de facto advantages.  
 
• End-user prices 
Considering telecom service prices, the 1998 liberalization reached some success quite 
rapidly. In 1998, the general telecom service prices39 decrease was still weak, with only 2.6 
%. But the year 1999 saw a dramatic price drop by 14.7 %. In the first ten months of 2000, 
telecom service prices even declined by 16.8%. Since 2000 however, prices have stagnated 
with even a light increase between 2001 and 2002 due to a change in the tariff structure. 
Since the liberalization, prices generally decreased for both the private and commercial 
sectors in Switzerland: respectively –8,6 % for private and – 24,6% for commercial 
activities40. 
 
In international comparison, the current Swiss end-users prices are average, as shown in the 
tables below. 
  
Figure 6: Fixed voice Telephony, 3 minute local call, average charge in PPP € 
Source ITU 
 
                                                          
39 Global consumption price index, OFCOM, Statistique des télécommunications : Evolution jusqu’au 31 
décembre 2002 pour certains indicateurs, 2003 
40  OECD, Competition and regulation issues in telecommunications, 2002, p. 357. These price drops are much 
more important than the OECD average : -1,8% for private and – 2,9% for commercial.  
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Figure 7: Mobile telephony, 3 minute local call, average charge in PPP € 
Source ITU 
 
With respect to prices, the Swiss regulatory authorities have had no major impact on the 
telecom services market. Even though the Telecommunications Law wants to assure fair 
prices for consumers, the regulatory framework objectives do not include a direct control over 
prices, but rather assure healthy competition between telecom providers. In the view of the 
Swiss regulatory regime, competition is the key element in order to create dynamism of offers 
and telecom services at advantageous prices for consumers. However, the regulator has a 
control over prices by fixing price caps for telecom services provided by the holder of the 
universal service provider. All the telecom companies have lower prices than the limit fixed by 
the regulation, except for the services where there is no or very few competition. The most 
notable ones are the incumbent’s last mile monopoly access – where Swisscom applies the 
highest price permitted by the law – and the leased lines, a service with still little 
competition41, where Swisscom applies prices that are much higher than the OECD average.  
 
7.2 Public service  
 
• Availability of services throughout Switzerland 
 
ADSL coverage: 95% of local switches Leased lines: n.d.  
ISDN 100% availability Voice telephony over cable: available 
Penetration rate CATV 37% population, 77% 
households, cable modem availability for 2 
million CATV connections 
Voice telephony over powerline: pilot projects
FWA availability: yes Mobile coverage in percentage of population 
99% (OECD 2003)  
 
Sources: OFCOM, Statistique des télécommunications, évolution jusqu’au 31 décembre 2002 pour 
certains indicateurs, 2003, OECD, Communications Outlook 2003, www.swisscable.ch  
 
The availability of services is good in Switzerland, especially in the region stretching from 
Geneva to St Gallen (the lowlands) where most of the Swiss population lives. In the mountain 
regions, there are areas where mobile or broadband services are not yet available. There 
exists little information about the availability of services in the country, as the OFCOM does 
not collect this type of information. Globally speaking, availability of services in Switzerland is 
similar to that of most European countries.  
 
                                                          
41  Especially in the rural areas.  
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There are no specific policies for developing new technologies such as power line 
communications or FWA, the responsibility is left to the enterprises to propose new solutions. 
As far as broadband Internet (ADSL & cable modem so far) is concerned, the Swiss 
government has elaborated a strategy entitled ‘Strategy of the Federal Council for an 
Information Society in Switzerland’ in 1998, which focuses on the expansion and 
improvement of Internet within the country. A special working group within the OFCOM is in 
charge of implementing the Federal Council’s strategy. The actual impact of this strategy on 
the availability of services is limited to the deployment of Internet in schools and the 
administration.  
 
All in all, the regulator’s role with regards availability of services is very limited in Switzerland.  
 
• Quality of services (QoS) throughout the country  
Globally speaking the quality of telecom service is good throughout the country. In 
Switzerland, the quality of service is not based on strong regulation incentives, but rather on 
the competitive market providing dynamism between competitors. Still, Universal Service 
Obligations standards are frequently adapted by the Federal Council which has the 
competencies to fix the USO standards obligations.  
 
The LTC gives very few regulatory mandates to the OFCOM about QoS surveillance. 
Consequently, the NRA does not provide services such as assistance on the website or lists 
about the telecom services’ quality of different operators. However, the Swiss regulator holds 
adequate quality control over some licensees, such as the universal service provider or major 
mobile licensees.  
 
• Information to the public 
The Swiss regulator has no special mandate to provide services to the consumers. As the 
Swiss Telecommunications Law does not stipulate specific tasks for the regulator to provide 
consumers service, there are no consumer oriented report produced by the OFCOM. The 
statistics and data provided by the OFCOM are more market and industry oriented. To 
compare prices and quality of services, consumers have to refer to the provider’s websites or 
to private consumers association. Unlike many of its counterparts, the OFCOM thus has a 
very small role to play in this field.  
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8. Conclusion  
 
In Switzerland, the consumer demand for communication services has grown greatly over the 
past few years. The telecommunications sector guarantees not only a basic service offering 
for all segments of the population, but also makes a contribution to the development by 
means of large investments in new technologies. An important factor in the Swiss national 
economy is the future evolution of the information society. After several years of liberalization, 
from the viewpoint of consumers, notable changes and successes can be discerned. 
However, there are still weak areas in the telecommunications market development due to 
the regulatory and legal framework. 
 
One objective of the 1997 Telecommunications Law reform was to have a ‘light’ general legal 
framework that would permit further adaptations to the sector’s needs. At that time, the 
legislators did not know how the liberalization of the telecom market would work. For this 
reason the legal mechanisms adopted a learning approach, in order to make self-regulation 
and adaptation possible depending on the future market’s needs. This approach was 
considered as the best reasonable choice for Telecommunications Law makers, as the 
further adaptation could be enforced by ordinance or law amendments.  
 
Yet, evidence has shown that with the current legislation, the NRA does not have the ability 
to enforce the necessary regulation in the most relevant markets, i.e., where dominance and 
market failures are confirmed. Where effective competition among providers has been able to 
establish itself, the Telecommunications Law has reached the objectives desired by the 
legislator. For consumers, it is undeniable that today’s telecom services availability has made 
Switzerland a much more attractive place than before the liberalization. However, despite the 
positive results for consumers, the liberalization process with its promises is facing a danger 
in some areas. The main reason for this is the continuing Swisscom de facto monopoly over 
the access network. Full access to consumers for competing operators has not been 
implemented yet, mainly because of the incumbent’s resistance and the unclear 
Telecommunications Law language leaving too much room for interpretation. Also, for various 
communication services, competitors are limited to resell products and technology, defined 
by the incumbent and have then no possibility to offer services adapted to their own 
customers’ needs. The regulation of leased line prices which the NRA was ready to 
implement has been rendered impossible by the Federal Court’s decisions. The lack of 
competitive pressure in these areas provokes negative economic consequences and leads to 
restricted freedom of choice for end-users. This is making Switzerland a particular case 
regarding the telecoms sector, as the European Union is actively trying to improve the 
general conditions for new players in the market and to increase competition. Furthermore, 
Switzerland is running the risk of missing technology and market trends, possibly making the 
Swiss telecom sector an unattractive market, with the risk of paralyzing competition and 
provoking the degradation of IT offers and dynamism.  
 
As mentioned earlier, an amendment to the Swiss Telecommunications Legislation is 
pending. The public consultation results closed on October 15, 2002.  The proposed 
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amendments concern the unbundling of the local loop and the application of non-
discriminatory leased lines pricing and availability. A first modification has already occurred 
through change in the Telecommunications Decree, which has been implemented in April 
2003. A second one is planned through modification of the Telecommunications Act. With the 
first option, the Federal Council is running the risk that Swisscom appeals any of ComCom’s 
decisions based on the decree, by arguing that the legal provision is not a sufficient one. With 
the LTC modification option, the process can take several years to pass through parliament, 
and the issue is uncertain because of political resistance and Swisscom lobbying. The very 
recent decisions at the governmental level show that the Federal Council is strongly 
determined to break the remaining incumbent’s monopoly. In order to have the greatest 
chance of reaching the objective of complete liberalization, the government has decided to 
attack Swisscom’s last monopoly with both options – decree and LTC modification – at the 
same time.  
 
The 1997 Telecommunications Law set up a regulatory framework that could freely enforce 
the necessary measures in order to avoid market failures. The ComCom received a very wide 
range of statutory competencies. However, the current situation is extraordinarily different 
from the 1997 LTC projects, mainly because of the Federal Court’s ability to overrule the 
NRA’s decisions. At the moment, the main challenges of the regulatory system are: 
 
• The Federal Court’s ability to overrule ComCom’s and OFCOM’s telecom specific 
regulations (i.e., interconnection and access issues) 
• The unclear language of the LTC (which leaves room for contradictory interpretation 
and may paralyze the sector’s development towards a competitive marketplace) 
• A lack of resources of the OFCOM (financial, number of legal experts)  
• The weaknesses of the Competition Commission (resources and expertise in 
telecommunications market matters) which has sometimes problems to properly apply 
the competition law to the telecom sector.  
• Asymmetry of information and resources in favor of Swisscom  
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